

Article

Defense Diplomacy and the Status of Forces Agreements in HADR: A Philippine Case Study

Mark Lester D. Mora¹, Editha Praditya Duarte², and Firre An Suprpto³

Corresponding author. *Email: m.mora.navy.ph@gmail.com

Submitted: 2026-01-23 | Accepted: 2026-04-27 | Published: 30th April 2026

Abstract

This study investigates how Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs) operationalize humanitarian assistance and disaster response (HADR) during tropical cyclone-related disasters. The study uses a qualitative case study design and document analysis. The analysis focuses on the Philippines' Status of Visiting Forces Agreement (SOVFA) and the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA). The results suggest that SOFAs can help reduce legal-administrative uncertainty for foreign military assistance and support coordination, early recovery, and institutional outcomes. The study highlights that SOFAs are strategic tools of defense diplomacy not only for security cooperation but also for humanitarian coordination, while longer-term resilience-related effects remain indirect and contingent.

Keywords: Defense Diplomacy, Status of Forces Agreements, VFA, SOVFA, HADR

^{1,2} Student at Republic of Indonesia Defense University, Jakarta, Indonesia.

³ University of Surabaya, Surabaya, Indonesia

I. Introduction

1.1. Background

The traditional role of an armed force is to fight and win across land, sea, and air. The military also functions as strategic deterrence against external and other threats, and coercion as a diplomatic tool ([Neethling, 2000](#)). However, modern militaries also perform what are often called “secondary roles”. These include humanitarian assistance and disaster response (HADR), peacekeeping operations, and a role in socio-economic development ([Neethling, 2000](#)). The shift in the conventional approach of coercion and deterrence to activities where mutual trust, transparency and interoperability are developed emerged particularly in the post-Cold War era ([Cottey & Forster, 2004](#)).

According to [Cottey and Forster \(2004\)](#), defense diplomacy refers to the peaceful use of defense resources to achieve national and foreign policy objectives through activities such as bilateral and multilateral engagements, defense cooperation agreements, defense education exchanges, military training exercises, the provision of military equipment and other material aid, and peacekeeping. HADR is another mechanism used in defense diplomacy to enhance mutual trust, confidence and transparency ([Chang, 2022](#)). One example is the inclusion of HADR as one of the seven practical areas of cooperation in the ADMM-Plus framework ([Wahyudi, 2021, as cited in Silalahi, 2023](#)). Moreover, there is an increasing trend of relying on military forces and personnel in HADR operations, especially during large-scale disasters where extensive rescue and relief capabilities are required ([Kodama, 2021](#)). HADR refers to the coordinated humanitarian and military activities that provide immediate response and relief, life-saving support, critical logistics, and early recovery operations in areas affected by disasters ([ASEAN Regional Forum, 2010](#)).

Status of Forces Agreements (SOFAs) are legal instruments that enable broader defense cooperation and can contribute to the achievement of defense diplomacy objectives. A SOFA is a bilateral or multilateral agreement that establishes the legal status, rights, and obligations of a visiting military force operating within a foreign territory ([Mason, 2012](#)). According to [Kodama \(2021\)](#), the U.S. Forces Stationed in Japan were able to provide rescue and relief support during the East Japan Earthquake in 2011 due to the existing 1960 Japan-U.S. SOFA. This example illustrates how SOFAs enable HADR operations in case of disasters.

In the Philippine context, the mechanisms that define the legal position of U.S. and Australian military forces are the VFA and the SOVFA, respectively. These agreements feature some differences but share core objectives, such as military capacity-building, strengthening alliances for regional stability, intensifying campaigns against terrorism and transnational crimes ([Velasco, 2015](#)). These agreements also act as a platform to enhance interoperability and bilateral national security operations such as HADR through annual combined exercises, as exemplified during the Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda) in 2013 ([Australian Embassy, The Philippines, 2013](#)) and analyses of alliance frameworks show how legal and operational tools can make this kind of cooperation feasible ([Rabena, 2020](#)). During the typhoon, existing alliance and status arrangements were instrumental in the quick response of the U.S. ([Lum & Margesson, 2014](#)) and Australian forces for HADR ([Australian Embassy, The Philippines, 2013](#); [Australian Government Department of Defence, 2013](#); [Nepomuceno, 2021](#)).

The Philippines is located within the Pacific Ring of Fire and the Typhoon Belt, which makes it frequently exposed to typhoons and one of the countries with the highest

vulnerabilities to disasters ([World Bank & Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery \[GFDRR\], 2016](#); [Japan International Cooperation Agency, 2025](#)). The country is susceptible to typhoons, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, and tsunamis which heightens the importance of rapid disaster response and relief ([World Bank & GFDRR, 2016](#)). According to the [World Bank \(2017\)](#), the Philippines experiences an average of 20 tropical cyclones every year. This is supported by the Philippine Atmospheric, Geophysical and Astronomical Services Administration (PAGASA) publications on tropical cyclone reports from 2020-2024, as shown in Table 1.

Table 1. Philippine Tropical Cyclone Data 2020-2024

Year	No of Tropical Cyclones that Occurred within Philippine Area of Responsibility	No of Landfalling Tropical Cyclones
2020	22	11
2021	15	9
2022	18	5
2023	11	4
2024	18	8

Source: PAGASA Tropical Cyclone Publication and Annual Reporting Series (2020-2024)

While HADR is primarily a civilian function, studies indicate that military involvement in HADR, including foreign military assistance, can support not only immediate relief operations but also broader civilian tasks such as post-conflict reconstruction or rehabilitation ([Hall, 2008](#)), while contributing to broader outcomes through the restoration of health-care infrastructure and other related human-rights concerns ([Canyon et al., 2019](#)). Moreover, foreign military involvement is likely to remain important in major international disasters ([Wiharta et al., 2008](#)). These points highlight the importance of pre-existing arrangements, such as SOFAs, that can help speed up legal, logistical, and operational processes for international disaster relief assistance ([Wiharta et al., 2008](#)).

Philippine disaster experience suggests that a major challenge in typhoon response is not only the availability of assets, but also the ability to coordinate them effectively when response demands rapidly exceed local capacity. Post-Haiyan studies found that response capacity varied across levels of government, that some local authorities were themselves overwhelmed by the disaster, and that lower levels of government were not yet fully familiar with cluster-based coordination arrangements ([Dy & Stephens, 2016](#); [Trajano, 2016](#)). These studies also show that coordination among government, international responders, and civil society was at times uneven in the early phase of the response ([Dy & Stephens, 2016](#); [Trajano, 2016](#)). At the operational level, the response was further constrained by logistics bottlenecks, including difficult access to remote communities and continuing landing-slot constraints at Tacloban Airport ([United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs \[OCHA\], 2013](#)). Earlier assessments after Ondoy and Pepeng likewise found that many affected local government units were not sufficiently prepared and recommended stronger local government capacity, improved emergency-response capability, and end-to-end early warning systems ([Government of the Republic of the Philippines et al., 2010](#)). These Philippine experiences help explain why it is important to examine how legal and coordination arrangements, including SOFAs, influence the conduct of HADR operations.

Empirical research on how SOFAs affect the effectiveness of HADR operations in the Philippines, particularly during tropical cyclone-related disasters, appears limited. Much

of the SOFA literature addresses these agreements within legal and military operational frameworks (e.g., [Sari, 2008](#); [Voetelink, 2013](#)). This study examines how SOFAs have been utilized as instruments of defense diplomacy in the Philippines to facilitate HADR efforts. It also examines how legal-diplomatic mechanisms operationalized through SOFAs may influence HADR effectiveness during tropical cyclone-related disaster settings. The study is anchored in Defense Diplomacy Theory, Complex Interdependence Theory, and the Human Security Framework.

1.2. Problem

This study aims to empirically examine the role of SOFAs, particularly in the context of non-traditional security challenges such as HADR. The research specifically seeks to respond to the following specific questions:

1. How do SOFAs affect foreign military and civil defense participation in HADR operations in the Philippines?
2. What HADR activities and post-disaster early recovery, resilience, and institutional initiatives are documented under SOFA agreements during major disasters?
3. What documented outcomes of SOFA-enabled HADR operations relate to early recovery, resilience, and institutional outcomes?

1.3. Literature Review

The review of literature is divided into five main sections since this study looks at the Philippine situation through the analytical lenses of defense diplomacy, SOFAs, humanitarian operations, and early recovery, and institutional outcomes: (1) defense diplomacy and non-coercive military cooperation; (2) the establishment and roles of SOFAs; (3) foreign military support in HADR operations; (4) disaster governance and human security; and (5) development-oriented peacebuilding in post-disaster situations. Each section directly supports the conceptual and analytical framework used in subsequent chapters and expands on ideas presented in the Introduction.

Defense diplomacy is the peacetime, cooperative use of defense and military instruments that states employ to advance their foreign policy goals, build trust, reduce uncertainty, and enhance interoperability ([Cottey & Forster, 2004](#)). Modern defense diplomacy emphasizes capacity building, information sharing, training initiatives, joint exercises, confidence-building measures, and the development of defense agreements and legal frameworks ([Drab, 2018](#)). These approaches cultivate strategic relationships, enhance crisis management, and promote stability through peaceful defense engagement rather than coercion ([Cottey & Forster, 2004](#); [Drab, 2018](#)).

Since the end of the Cold War, defense diplomacy has changed in three main ways. First, it changed from mostly focusing on roles centered on the use or threat of force to peacetime, cooperative defense engagements, with ties to foreign policy goals and, in some cases, support for humanitarian and stabilization efforts ([Cottey & Forster, 2004](#); [Drab, 2018](#)). Second, institutionalized collaboration and the development of trust are given more importance. Coordination frameworks and status arrangements help clarify legal status and practical procedures. This reduces legal and administrative friction which makes cooperation more predictable ([Cottey & Forster, 2004](#); [Fleck, 2012](#)). Third, humanitarian crises have made these arrangements more useful in real life: foreign military assets can provide lift, logistics, engineering, and command-and-control surge capacity in large disasters, but guidance says they should be based on requests, coordinated by civilian humanitarian leaders, and respect

sovereignty ([United Nations General Assembly \[UNGA\], 1991](#); [United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs \[OCHA\], 2007](#)).

The Philippines has a long history of defense cooperation with the U.S. and Australia. The PH–U.S. Visiting Forces Agreement and the PH–Australia Status of Visiting Forces Agreement ([Velasco, 2015](#)) are examples of legal agreements that facilitate such cooperation. These frameworks, which were initially intended for exercises and regular cooperation, can also streamline humanitarian assistance by reducing legal and administrative friction. For example, U.S. operational reporting on disaster response says that the VFA helped speed up U.S. response during major relief operations in the Philippines ([U.S. Pacific Command, 2013](#)). One of the main legal issues that SOFAs and similar agreements try to solve is the allocation of criminal jurisdiction for visiting personnel ([Voetelink, 2013](#)).

Although disaster-response and civil–military coordination literature recognizes that legal and administrative barriers may hinder or complicate international relief operations, most guidance addresses these concerns at a broad level (e.g., entry, customs, and permissions) rather than examining how specific SOFA provisions influence HADR performance dimensions such as deployment speed, access, coordination efficiency, or operational continuity ([International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies \[IFRC\], 2007](#); [OCHA, 2007](#)).

The legal status, rights, obligations, and safeguards of foreign military personnel present in a host nation are outlined in SOFAs, which may be bilateral or multilateral agreements ([Mason, 2012](#)). They typically address jurisdictional arrangements, movement and access permissions, entry/exit procedures, customs and tax exemptions, logistics and supply operations, environmental obligations, and dispute resolution mechanisms ([Fleck, 2012](#)). SOFAs provide the fundamental guidelines that enable exercises, visits, and brief deployments even while they generally do not confer basing rights in and of themselves.

The literature identifies several core functions of SOFAs shown in Figure 1:

Clarifying Legal Jurisdiction	Establishing Movement And Access Rights	Defining Logistics And Support Arrangements	Safeguarding Personnel	Creating Coordination Mechanisms
SOFAs allocate criminal and civil jurisdiction/claims between the host and sending states, reducing disputes and enabling predictable deployments (Fleck, 2012; Mason, 2012).	SOFAs often address entry/exit, customs procedures, and access to agreed facilities; other clearances may be set through implementing arrangements (Fleck, 2012).	SOFAs may address contracting/contractors, contracting, and logistical support for equipment and supplies; detailed sustainment may be set in implementing arrangements (Fleck, 2012; Mason 2012).	Provisions commonly include privileges and immunities, claims handling, safety/security provisions, and other protections supporting safe and efficient deployment (Fleck, 2012; Mason, 2012).	SOFAs may include consultation or implementation mechanisms and agreed points of contact to coordinate activities and resolve issues (Fleck, 2012).

Figure 1. Core Functions of SOFAs

Source: [Fleck \(2012\)](#); [Mason \(2012\)](#)

In the case of U.S. and Japan, U.S. troops stationed in Japan were able to help with relief and rescue efforts after the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake under Operation TOMODACHI within the broader Japan–U.S. security arrangements, including the SOFA ([Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2022](#)). Although the main goal of SOFAs and other visiting forces agreements is to standardize the status and privileges / jurisdictional treatment of foreign military personnel, their relevance is especially important during major

emergencies. This illustrates why inter-state frameworks should be prearranged to reduce legal and administrative impediments and allow rapid entry and movement of forces ([Kodama, 2021](#)). Further, when such arrangements are in place, foreign military forces with advantages in rapid deployment, self-sufficiency, and transportation can enter and relocate more quickly for humanitarian operations ([Wiharta et al., 2008](#)).

During the 2013 Typhoon Haiyan response, the Philippine government provided “quick clearance” for U.S. personnel and aircraft such as C-130s and MV-22 Ospreys which allowed for rapid delivery of relief supplies ([The White House, 2013](#)). Similarly, Australia deployed two 37-person Australian Medical Assistance Teams (AusMAT), together with aircraft including a C-17A Globemaster and a C-130J Hercules for the airlift of medical personnel and equipment from Cebu to Tacloban ([Australian Embassy, The Philippines, 2013](#)).

Foreign military assistance has become increasingly prominent in major disaster responses worldwide. Literature on HADR which highlights several reasons for this argument is shown in Figure 2:

Foreign Militaries Possess Unique Capabilities	Rapid Deployment Requirements	Increasing Complexity of Disasters	Coordination Frameworks Shape Effectiveness
<p>These capabilities include strategic airlift/sea lift, engineering, medical support, and communications which are often large at scale in affected states (OCHA, 2007; Wiharta et al., 2008).</p>	<p>Large disasters require immediate surge capacity; military forces are structured for rapid mobilization and self-sustainment when requested and coordinated (UNGA, 1991; OCHA, 2007; Wiharta et al., 2008).</p>	<p>Urban density, cascading hazards, and climate-driven extremes increase demand and can exceed civilian capacities, prompting requests for MCDA support (OCHA, 2007; UNDRR, 2019).</p>	<p>Operations are more effective when legal and coordination frameworks (consent, humanitarian principles, civil-military coordination) are established (UNGA, 1991; OCHA, 2007)</p>

Figure 2. Key Drivers of Foreign Military Involvement in HADR

Source: [OCHA \(2007\)](#); [United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction \[UNDRR\] \(2019\)](#); [Wiharta et al. \(2008\)](#)

The Philippines has repeatedly received foreign military assistance during major tropical cyclone-related disasters when domestic logistics, lift, engineering, communications, and medical capacities were temporarily overwhelmed. This pattern aligns with existing literature regarding the utilization of foreign military and civil defense resources in sudden-onset disasters, highlighting their comparative advantages in rapid deployment, air/sea lift, engineering, and command-and-control, contingent upon these resources being request-driven, time-sensitive, and coordinated under civilian humanitarian leadership ([OCHA, 2007](#)). Empirical syntheses indicate that foreign military assets predominantly provide air transport, medical support, and specialized personnel, while cautioning that effectiveness is contingent upon coordination frameworks and role clarity among civilian responders ([Wiharta et al., 2008](#)).

By reorienting the emphasis from territorial protection to the protection of people's lives and well-being, the UNDP's Human Security paradigm transforms our understanding of security. Additionally, it discusses the many forms of insecurity that exist, including risks to one's environment, economy, community, and health ([UNDP, 1994](#)). This point of view stresses how important it is to prioritize health, survival, protecting livelihoods, and restoring

essential services during disasters. Scholarly critiques note that the scope of "human security" can reduce analytical precision unless it is operationalized through clearly specified objectives and indicators ([Paris, 2001](#)).

Within the security–development literature, the security–development nexus argues that sustainable recovery requires aligned interventions across governance, security, and development systems, because legitimacy, social cohesion, and service delivery are mutually reinforcing in crisis-affected environments ([Duffield, 2007](#)). Although initially developed for conflict and post-conflict contexts, this integrated logic is often applied to disaster recovery because disasters can also erode institutions, disrupt livelihoods and markets, degrade infrastructure, displace populations, and strain social cohesion which are conditions that similarly complicate recovery and raise governance demands ([Tschirgi, 2010](#)). Framed this way, developmental peacebuilding provides a coherent lens for interpreting how early restoration of connectivity, services, and institutional functionality can contribute to longer-term resilience and recovery trajectories.

Despite the maturity of HADR and civil–military coordination literature, fewer studies systematically examine how the legal-diplomatic enabling environment, including SOFAs and related arrangements, relates to HADR speed, coordination quality, and early recovery conditions. Evaluations focused on policy also show how SOFAs make deployments more predictable and less prone to delay by making the law clearer for both the sending and host governments ([International Security Advisory Board, 2015](#)). This gap necessitates the use of a structured analytical model (e.g., IPOO framework) to keep track of how legal inputs are turned into operational procedures and humanitarian outputs. Over time, this may have an indirect effect on institutional outcomes.

1.4. Conceptual and Analytical Framework

The study is anchored on the understanding that SOFAs can function as policy enablers of defense diplomacy that shape the conditions for humanitarian, early recovery, and institutional outcomes, not only as military and legal arrangements. A standard definition of SOFA is an agreement that specifies the legal status of a visiting military force deployed in a friendly state's territory ([Conderman, 2013](#)). In the Philippine context, these arrangements have become more significant than their original purpose particularly in crisis-response cooperation.

Four theories serve as the foundation for the conceptual framework. Defense diplomacy theory ([Cottey & Forster, 2004](#)) argues that defense diplomacy activities foster mutual trust, transparency and interoperability. Complex Interdependence Theory emphasizes that contemporary international relations are defined by multiple channels of interaction and shared vulnerabilities, where cooperation rather than coercion becomes the dominant logic ([Keohane & Nye, 1977](#)). The Human Security Framework views security as not just protecting the borders but broadly includes the protection of a state's citizens from poverty, disease, political violence and calamities ([UNDP, 1994](#); [Paris, 2001](#)). The Developmental Peacebuilding Theory ([Duffield, 2007](#); [Tschirgi, 2010](#)) integrates development, security and governance into post-conflict or post-disaster construction. Among these, Defense Diplomacy Theory serves as the primary explanatory lens, while the Human Security Framework, Complex Interdependence Theory, and Developmental Peacebuilding Theory provide supporting perspectives for interpreting people-centered, cooperative, and institutional dimensions of HADR. This framework is illustrated in Figure 3.




Figure 3. Conceptual Framework

To examine how SOFAs operationalize defense diplomacy in humanitarian and early recovery contexts, the study adapts an Input–Process–Output–Outcome (IPOO) model (Kusek & Rist, 2004) as a qualitative analytical tool. Rather than implying linear causality, the IPOO serves to organize the sequence of relationships observed in policy and case evidence. Table 2 illustrates how SOFAs (inputs) may facilitate defense diplomacy mechanisms (processes), contributing to humanitarian operations (outputs) and to potential early recovery, resilience, and institutional outcomes.

Table 2. Analytical Framework

Element	Analytical Focus	Indicators	Analytical Purpose
Inputs	Legal frameworks (VFA, SOVFA), institutional mandates, partner capabilities (U.S., Australia), and logistical assets	Existence and enforcement of SOFAs; interoperability provisions; other defense agreements	Establishes legitimacy and authorization for joint HADR operations
Processes	Activation of defense diplomacy mechanisms during crisis (coordination, joint command, logistics, information sharing)	Rapid entry procedures; harmonized command; customs	Maximizes speed of response by eliminating bureaucratic friction;

		and overflight clearance	accelerates force deployment.
Outputs	HADR activities (airlift, engineering, medical, logistics, disaster needs assessment) and civil-military coordination	Number of sorties, aid delivered, infrastructure repaired, Local Government Units (LGUs) assisted	Immediate relief and restored operational mobility
Outcomes	Early recovery, resilience, and institutional learning implications; capacity-building, infrastructure rehabilitation, strengthened LGU readiness	Post-event rehabilitation projects, training sessions, continuity in local disaster plans	May support resilience through capacity-building and improvements in public-response capability, while also fostering mutual trust and interoperability.

SOFA agreements such as the Philippines–U.S. VFA and the Philippines–Australia SOVFA provide the legal and administrative basis for the temporary presence of foreign forces, clarifying entry/exit procedures, criminal jurisdiction, customs, duties/tax exemptions and import/export procedures, and support for movement and access. In disaster response, these provisions complement international guidance (e.g., the Oslo Guidelines) that frames foreign military and civil defense assets as a support option when civilian capacity is insufficient and when the host state requests assistance ([OCHA, 2007](#); [Voetelink, 2013](#)).




Figure 4. Analytical IPOO Structure

The IPOO framework provides a structured way to trace how policy instruments (SOFAs) are discussed in relation to operational processes and broader humanitarian or institutional implications, in alignment with qualitative case study methodology. The study emphasizes process tracing, document analysis, and textual coding instead of numerical causation to clarify how defense diplomacy mechanisms relate to humanitarian, early recovery, and institutional outcomes.

II. Method

This study employs a qualitative case study design to examine how SOFAs shape the conditions for foreign military participation in HADR, as well as related humanitarian, early recovery, and institutional outcomes, in the Philippines ([Creswell & Poth, 2018](#)). A policy-

oriented document analysis was employed to examine how legal arrangements were translated into operational practice across specific disaster events. The study is interpretive in orientation and emphasizes contextual understanding of defense diplomacy within specific political, legal, and institutional settings rather than statistical generalization (Creswell & Poth, 2018). For analysis, the study traced recurring patterns across the Input–Process–Output–Outcome (IPOO) sequence already set out in the analytical framework: legal frameworks, institutional mandates, partner capabilities, and logistical assets as inputs; activation of defense diplomacy mechanisms during crisis, including coordination, joint command, logistics, and information sharing, as processes; documented HADR activities and civil-military coordination as outputs; and early recovery, resilience, and institutional learning implications, including capacity-building, infrastructure rehabilitation, and strengthened local government unit readiness, as outcomes.

The two SOFAs examined are the Philippines–United States Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) and the Philippines–Australia Status of Visiting Forces Agreement (SOVFA). These agreements were selected because they are active, legally binding instruments that govern the temporary presence of foreign forces in the Philippines and have publicly documented relevance to disaster-response cooperation. Six tropical cyclone-related disaster events were examined as the study’s primary cases: Ondoy/Ketsana (2009), Juan/Megi (2010), Pablo/Bopha (2012), Yolanda/Haiyan (2013), and the successive 2025 typhoons Tino/Kalmaegi and Uwan/Fung-Wong. Case selection followed four considerations: the event had to be a major tropical cyclone-related disaster affecting the Philippines; publicly accessible materials had to document United States and/or Australian military involvement relevant to the analysis; the case had to contain evidence relevant to at least one stage of the IPOO framework; and the final set also provided temporal spread for limited process tracing across different periods. Not all cases involved both partners, and the analysis reports only what is verifiable in the documentary record.

The study used three complementary source groups: official documents, archival statements, and credible media and secondary sources. Official documents included the texts of the VFA and SOVFA, government and defense issuances, and disaster-response or disaster-governance documents from relevant Philippine, U.S., and Australian institutions. Archival materials included embassy statements, official releases, and publicly accessible operational reporting. Media and secondary sources included reputable news reports, policy papers, and scholarly works used to contextualize and interpret the primary documentary record. Documents were identified through targeted searches of official government and defense portals, embassy websites, and reputable repositories such as ReliefWeb and official archives, then screened for relevance to the six cases and to SOFA-related operational details (Bowen, 2009). Materials were retained when they contained information on legal provisions, entry and clearance procedures, logistics, coordination arrangements, documented HADR activities, or post-disaster preparedness and recovery effects.

The three complementary sources of data are listed in Table 3:

Table 3. Data Collection Sources

Sources	Data Examples
---------	---------------

	Texts of VFA and SOVFA;
Official Documents	Government documents, policy issuances from the ministries of defense and international affairs of the Philippines, U.S., and Australia; and Reports from disaster resilience institutions such as Office of Civil Defense (OCD) and National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council (NDRRMC).
Archival	Statements from the Philippine embassies in the U.S. and Australia, and the U.S. and Australian embassies in Manila.
Media and secondary sources	Official press releases, news articles, editorials, and social media posts; Scholarly publications, policy briefs and defense white papers; and public sources.

Qualitative content analysis was applied as the main analytical technique ([Krippendorff, 2018](#)). Textual units were coded and grouped according to the IPOO categories in order to trace how SOFA provisions were linked to operational mechanisms, humanitarian outputs, and documented early recovery, resilience-related, and institutional effects. To strengthen validity, the study triangulated information across official documents, archival statements, and credible secondary sources; claims were treated as stronger when at least two source types converged on the same point, while claims supported by thinner evidence were stated more cautiously. This approach follows qualitative case study principles that emphasize credibility, authenticity, and contextual interpretation through the use of multiple sources of evidence ([Stake, 1995](#); [Bowen, 2009](#)).

The documentary record is uneven across the six cases. Some events, particularly Haiyan/Yolanda (2013), are supported by richer official and analytical documentation than others. Accordingly, the comparative analysis draws stronger inferences where multiple source types converge and states claims more cautiously where case evidence is thinner.

III. Results, Analysis, and Discussion

This section presents the results, analysis, and discussion derived from the qualitative content analysis organized through the IPOO logic model. Evidence was categorized from the VFA and SOVFA texts, Philippine disaster-governance documents, and publicly available operational reporting and official releases on foreign military assistance ([Krippendorff, 2018](#)). To enhance comparability, each case is examined through the same analytical sequence: legal and institutional enablers, activation and coordination processes, documented HADR activities, and resulting early recovery, resilience-related, and institutional implications. The discussion focuses on six Philippine tropical cyclone-related disasters where foreign military assistance was documented: Tropical Storm Ondoy/Ketsana (2009), Super Typhoon Juan/Megi (2010), Typhoon Pablo/Bopha (2012), Super Typhoon Yolanda/Haiyan (2013), and the subsequent 2025 typhoons Tino/Kalmaegi and Uwan/Fung-Wong. Involvement varies by case: not all cases exhibit foreign military assistance from both the U.S. and Australia. The cases were included based on publicly available documents documenting U.S. and/or Australian military involvement. Other tropical cyclone events exhibit foreign military support; however, they are outside the scope of the six cases selected for comparability ([Australian Government Department of Defence](#),

[2013](#); [Carpenter, 2009](#); [Ehrenfeld & Aanenson, 2016](#); [Gassert et al., 2020](#); [The White House, 2013](#); [Tobler, 2025](#); [U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific, 2012, 2025](#); [Vernaza, 2010](#)). Unless directly attributed in the cited documents, table entries should be read as analytical inferences drawn from the documentary record rather than as direct proof of causal effect.

Table 4. Summary of Results - Inputs

Input Category	SOFA-Related Function	Illustrative Evidence from Typhoon Cases
Entry, overflight, and movement permissions	Pre-defined rules for entry/exit, movement, and authorized activities (air/sea/ground), which may reduce the time needed to deploy and reposition assets.	Haiyan (2013): rapid surge of U.S./Australian assets via agreed points of entry. Tino/Uwan (2025): U.S. forces conducted and concluded foreign disaster relief operations following Typhoons Kalmaegi and Fung-Wong.
Jurisdictional arrangements and legal protections	Clarifies criminal jurisdiction and privileges/ immunities, lowering legal uncertainty for partner deployments and supporting political acceptability.	Legal analyses emphasize predictability of status as a prerequisite to deploying forces abroad.
Logistics and support provisions (customs, taxes, services)	May facilitate customs clearance and support services for humanitarian cargo and equipment, thereby helping speed offloading and onward movement where coordination mechanisms are in place	Ondoy (2009): U.S. military assets supported flood rescue and relief assistance alongside Philippine responders. Haiyan (2013): heavy airlift/logistics augmented humanitarian supply chains during early response.
Coordination and liaison mechanisms	Supports liaison presence and coordination mechanisms that link foreign forces to host-nation agencies and clusters.	Effectiveness depends on embedding liaison/fusion cells into national coordination consistent with CMCoord guidance;

Source: [Australian Embassy, The Philippines \(2013\)](#); [Ehrenfeld and Aanenson \(2016\)](#); [Gassert et al. \(2020\)](#); [Tobler \(2025\)](#); [OCHA \(2007\)](#); [Voetelink \(2013\)](#)

3.1. Inputs: Legal and Institutional Enablers

Document analysis suggests that SOFAs function as legal-administrative enablers of foreign military participation in Philippine HADR. Across the cases reviewed, the VFA (Philippines–U.S.) and SOVFA (Philippines–Australia) appear to reduce friction by clarifying entry/exit, permissible activities, logistics support, and legal protections while Philippine disaster governance (e.g., National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Plan [NDRRMP]) and Civil-Military Coordination (CMCoord) guidance (e.g., Oslo Guidelines) provide the policy logic for the request-based, coordinated, and time-bound use of foreign military assets.

These inputs together make up a "permission and facilitation" package: (1) a legal basis for entry and operation, (2) institutional coordination pathways to connect foreign forces to the NDRRMC/cluster system, and (3) logistics provisions that speed up the movement of humanitarian cargo and personnel.

3.2. Processes: Operationalizing HADR Under SOFAs

Processes explain how these enablers were put into action in real life, from the sequence of diplomatic requests and acceptances to force entry and staging to civil-military coordination and finally transition or exit. Tables 5–9 combine recurring steps that indicate where the documentary record suggests that SOFA provisions may lower transaction costs:

Table 5. Activation of Foreign Military Assistance

Activation Sequence	Process Description with Case Anchors
1. Disaster impact and Philippine incident declaration	Philippine authorities activate national response mechanisms and assess gaps.
2. Request for international/foreign military assistance	Request coordinated via Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) and partners when gaps exceed domestic capacity; aligns with request-based principle.
3. Partner authorization and deployment decision	Partner governments authorize assistance and mobilize assets (e.g., Australia's 2013 Australian Defence Force [ADF] deployment for Haiyan; U.S. 2025 Foreign Disaster Relief [FDR] operations)
4. SOFA facilitation and entry/clearance	SOFA provisions facilitate entry, movement, and customs/port access for personnel and relief cargo
5. Integration into coordination and tasking	Foreign forces coordinate with Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP)/NDRRMC mechanisms (e.g., liaison/fusion cells) to prioritize lift and support tasks.

Source: [Australian Embassy, The Philippines \(2013\)](#); [Ehrenfeld and Aanenson \(2016\)](#); [Gassert et al. \(2020\)](#); [NDRRMC \(n.d.\)](#); [Tobler \(2025\)](#); [Government of Australia and Government of the Philippines \(2007\)](#); [OCHA \(2007\)](#); [Government of the Republic of the Philippines and Government of the United States of America \(1998\)](#); [Voetelink \(2013\)](#)

Table 5 suggests a recurring activation sequence: a request from the Philippines, approval from the partner government, and relatively quick deployment through agreed-upon points of entry. During Ondoy (2009), U.S. forces already in the Philippines (Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines [JSOTF-P]) helped with flood rescue operations along with Philippine responders. This suggests how existing arrangements can help speed up response times.

Table 6. Deployment and Staging

Deployment / Staging Aspect	Case-Based Observation (APA in-text)
-----------------------------	--------------------------------------

Aircraft staging and logistics hubs	Clark, Mactan-Cebu, and Manila/Villamor have been used as staging nodes for foreign lift into affected areas, notably during Haiyan (2013) and during the 2025 typhoons where operations were coordinated from hubs including Clark.
Naval anchorage and sea basing	Maritime assets can support offshore logistics and medical functions during surge response; Australia reported ADF air/sea/land support for Haiyan (2013).
Forward operating bases and liaison presence	Forward nodes support rapid distribution and coordination with AFP and clusters; effectiveness depends on embedded liaison.
Customs and offloading of humanitarian cargo	SOFA-related facilitation supports rapid offloading and onward movement, particularly for time-sensitive relief supplies

Source: [Australian Embassy, The Philippines \(2013\)](#); [Ehrenfeld and Aanenson \(2016\)](#); [Gassert et al. \(2020\)](#); [NDRRMC \(n.d.\)](#); [Tobler \(2025\)](#); [Government of Australia and Government of the Philippines \(2007\)](#); [OCHA \(2007\)](#); [Government of the Republic of the Philippines and Government of the United States of America \(1998\)](#); [Voetelink \(2013\)](#)

The documentary records summarized in Table 6 suggest that landing rights and customs-related facilitation likely helped reduce delays in the offloading and onward movement of humanitarian goods, although the extent of this effect varies by case.

Table 7. Civil-Military Coordination and Cluster Integration

Coordination Mechanisms	Functions
AFP–foreign fusion cells / liaison teams	Synchronize mission planning, prioritize lift routes, and reduce duplication with humanitarian agencies
Liaison officers linked to NDRRMC clusters	Facilitate information flow between foreign units and cluster leads; aligns with CMCoord best practice.
Joint engineering/medical task groups	Combine complementary capabilities (engineering, public health) for rapid restoration of access and services.
Incident Command / airspace and movement management	Helps manage congested airfields and prioritize missions during surge operations

Source: [Canyon et al. \(2019\)](#); [Ehrenfeld and Aanenson \(2016\)](#); [Gassert et al. \(2020\)](#); [NDRRMC \(n.d.\)](#); [OCHA \(2007\)](#)

Table 7 suggests that the effectiveness of coordination mechanisms depended in part on legal access arrangements, liaison practices, and their integration into host-nation coordination systems.

Table 8. Interoperability and Operational Synergy

Interoperability Area	SOFA Link and Case Evidence
-----------------------	-----------------------------

Heavy lift logistics (air/sea)	Enabled by access and support provisions; described as central to Haiyan response and 2025 FDR operations
Distribution and last-mile support	Requires coordinated tasking and access to facilities; effectiveness improves when linked to humanitarian logistics pipelines.
Telecommunications and information-sharing	Interoperability improves operational coordination, especially when civilian systems are disrupted.
Engineering and medical operations	Joint activities under logistics/support clauses can restore access and support health response.

Source: Canyon et al. (2019); Tobler (2025); Wiharta et al. (2008); OCHA (2007)

The areas of interoperability and operational synergy in Table 8 appear to be supported by access arrangements, logistics provisions, and coordination practices related to the wider legal and operational framework.

Table 9. Governance Alignment and Implementation Gaps

Observed Gaps	Implication
Limited LGU awareness of SOFA-related procedures	Weak local integration can slow tasking and transition; identified as a recurring challenge in civil–military disaster literature
Uneven Disaster Risk Reduction and Management (DRRM) capacity across regions	Variable effectiveness because local readiness shapes how quickly external support can be absorbed
Overlap/duplication with NGOs when tasking is unclear	Creates coordination inefficiencies; mitigated by stronger liaison and cluster integration
Customs/clearance bottlenecks when pre-coordination is weak	Can delay time-sensitive relief cargo; underscores need for SOPs and rehearsed clearances.

Source: Ehrenfeld and Aanenson (2016); Wiharta et al. (2008); NDRRMC (n.d.); OCHA (2007)

The gaps in Table 9 suggest that, although SOFAs can create enabling conditions, the effectiveness of procedures depends heavily on domestic governance capacity and local implementation.

3.3. Outputs: Humanitarian Activities Enabled by SOFAs

Outputs are the direct, tangible results of HADR activities. An examination of documents revealed numerous recurring categories in major disaster scenarios. Table 10 shows the results:

Table 10. Humanitarian Activities Enabled by SOFAs

Output Category	Description / Example
-----------------	-----------------------

Humanitarian logistics and air/sea lift	Rapid air/sea lift and logistics transport to move responders, equipment, and critical payloads; central to Haiyan (2013) and documented in later U.S. foreign disaster relief deployments.
Engineering and access restoration support	Debris clearance, road reopening, and temporary repairs to restore access and sustain distribution nodes during the surge phase.
Medical surge support	Emergency medical augmentation through deployed medical teams and field facilities during catastrophic events; documented for Haiyan (2013) through Australian-supported medical deployment.
Maritime and naval support	Sea-based platforms and rotary-wing lift can provide staging, communications, and coastal/island access support during surge periods.
Search and rescue and emergency evacuation	Targeted rescue and evacuation support when requested by the host state; documented U.S. support during Ondoy/Ketsana flooding
Civil-military coordination support to humanitarian actors	Liaison, coordination, and access support that enables civilian-led response consistent with Oslo Guidelines on Foreign Military and Civil Defense Assets.

Source: [Australian Government Department of Defence \(2013\)](#); [Australian Embassy, The Philippines \(2013\)](#); [Parker et al. \(2016\)](#); [Tobler \(2025\)](#); [OCHA \(2007\)](#); [Wiharta et al. \(2008\)](#)

These findings suggest that foreign military forces can function as an operational bridge between international humanitarian actors and national response frameworks.

3.4. Outcomes: Early Recovery, Resilience, and Institutional Learning

The outcomes suggest that SOFA-facilitated activities can contribute to broader institutional and early recovery improvements. In the documentary record, the strongest evidence concerns early recovery, preparedness, interoperability, and institutional learning; longer-term developmental effects are more indirect and should be interpreted cautiously. They may develop from cumulative contributions rather than being directly induced by external factors. Table 11 gives a brief overview of the results:

Table 11. Early Recovery, Resilience, and Institutional Learning

Outcome Category	Findings / Examples
------------------	---------------------

Enhanced preparedness and institutional learning	Post-event reviews and lessons learned from Haiyan and subsequent events highlight improved civil-military coordination practices and surge management when institutionalized
Accelerated early recovery conditions	Restored access (airfields, roads, ports) and re-established logistics flows enable civilian recovery programming to scale sooner after catastrophic impact.
Improved community resilience (human security)	Faster restoration of essential services and access pathways reduces secondary harms and supports continuity of livelihoods and public health.
Strengthened international partnerships (defense diplomacy)	Repeated operational cooperation during HADR reinforces interoperability and working relationships between partners and the host state.
Governance innovations and coordination mechanisms	Operational innovations such as liaison arrangements and multinational coordination practices are frequently emphasized in post-event analyses of large disasters.
Constraints and unresolved issues	Recurring constraints include sovereignty sensitivity, uneven local readiness, and coordination friction without clear roles and exit criteria.

Source: [Wiharta et al. \(2008\)](#); [Parker et al. \(2016\)](#); [Voetelink \(2013\)](#); [UNDP \(1994\)](#); [OCHA \(2007\)](#); [Duffield \(2007\)](#); [Tschirgi \(2010\)](#)

The outcomes of HADR operations associated with SOFAs suggest multifaceted implications for early recovery, institutional learning, and community resilience.

3.5. Synthesis of Findings

Taken together, the IPOO findings suggest that Inputs (SOFA provisions + national CMCoord/disaster governance) shape Processes (rapid activation, staging, liaison, and coordinated tasking). These processes contribute to Outputs (lift, engineering, medical, and support for humanitarian agencies), which may in turn support Outcomes such as faster service restoration, institutional learning, and stronger partnerships when transition planning and host-nation coordination capacity are sufficient ([OCHA, 2007](#); [Wiharta et al., 2008](#)).

Table 12. Synthesis of Findings

Event (Local / International)	Impact window	SOFA mechanism relevance	Key short-term operational outputs / early recovery link
Ondoy / Ketsana	Sep 2009	Standing status arrangements likely reduced entry and operating uncertainty for deployed forces when assistance was requested.	Targeted rescue assistance and access support during the emergency phase.
Juan / Megi	Oct 2010	Standing arrangements appear to have provided a ready legal pathway for rapid, request-based deployment.	Rotary-wing lift and movement of responders enabling rapid access to affected areas.
Pablo / Bopha	Dec 2012	Status arrangements appear to have supported rapid movement and operational support when requested.	Short-term lift/coordination support bridging access constraints and enabling response operations.
Yolanda / Haiyan	Nov 2013	VFA and SOVFA appear to have reduced entry/clearance uncertainty and supported high-tempo deployment.	Airlift surge, communications support, and medical surge enabling humanitarian access and early restoration of critical services.
Tino / Kalmaegi	Oct 2025	Standing arrangements appear to have facilitated rapid clearances and sustained coordination during successive storms.	Foreign disaster relief support and coordination bridging the surge period during successive cyclones.
Uwan / Fung-Wong	Nov 2025	Standing status arrangements appear to have provided a ready legal pathway for expedited entry/clearance, access to agreed facilities, and coordinated operations of foreign military assets when formally requested, reducing deployment uncertainty during surge conditions.	Rapid lift and distribution support for relief goods; aerial assessment and communications bridging to improve situational awareness; and short-term engineering/access-restoration support that restores access routes and helps re-establish basic services during early recovery.

3.6. Analysis and Discussion

The cases suggest that SOFAs may have helped reduce legal and administrative uncertainty for partner deployments, facilitated request-based cooperation, and provided a more predictable framework for support activities in politically sensitive settings ([Voetelink, 2013](#); [OCHA, 2007](#); [Parker et al., 2016](#)). The documentary sequence from Ondoy (2009) to Tino/Uwan (2025) suggests that the most immediate observable effects associated with SOFA agreements were administrative and logistical. Entry permissions, customs facilitation, access to facilities, and movement clearances likely influenced the speed and scale of life-saving assistance, especially in the early phase of response when time-sensitive lift, medical support, and logistics were most needed ([OCHA, 2007](#); [Lum & Margesson, 2014](#); [Tobler, 2025](#)).

At the same time, the cases also show that SOFA agreements are not guarantees of effectiveness. They provide enabling conditions, but they do not by themselves solve weaknesses in domestic disaster governance. Where local tasking was unclear, liaison integration into the cluster system was uneven, or transition and exit planning was weak, coordination frictions persisted and could lead to duplication, delayed prioritization, or short-lived capacity gains ([Wiharta et al., 2008](#); [Parker et al., 2016](#)). Across the cases, the documentary evidence is strongest on legal-administrative facilitation, operational speed, and early recovery support, while evidence for longer-term developmental outcomes remains more indirect and contingent on domestic absorption capacity and post-disaster governance.

These findings are important for theory and policy. From a defense diplomacy perspective, SOFAs can help transform bilateral defense relationships into practical humanitarian cooperation by making deployment procedures more predictable. From a human security perspective, their value lies less in the agreements themselves than in the operational effects they help make possible, such as faster restoration of access, communications, and relief distribution to affected communities ([UNDP, 1994](#); [OCHA, 2007](#)).

The broader policy implication is that legal arrangements work best when embedded in a wider disaster-governance system. SOFA provisions are most effective when they are linked to civilian-led coordination arrangements, common information systems, pre-designated ports or staging areas, and rehearsed procedures for liaison, tasking, and transition. In this sense, the paper's findings speak not only to defense diplomacy but also to broader policy discussions on how international legal arrangements can support more effective disaster governance ([OCHA, 2007](#); [Parker et al., 2016](#)).

Three policy recommendations follow from the cases. First, SOFA-related procedures should be further standardized and integrated in AFP–NDRRMC–DFA standard operating procedures, including templates for requests, customs and overflight clearances, access to facilities, liaison arrangements, mission tasking, and exit or transition procedures. Second, LGUs and cluster leads should be further trained on how foreign military support is requested, tasked, integrated, and time-bounded within a civilian-led response, consistent with the NDRP for Hydro-Meteorological Hazards, which emphasizes coordinated response mechanisms and the importance of local preparedness. Third, joint planning, HADR exercises, and after-action reviews should be sustained, expanded, and more systematically linked to doctrine, preparedness plans, and local readiness measures in order to strengthen the operationalization of existing coordination procedures ([OCHA, 2007](#); [Parker et al., 2016](#); [NDRRMC, n.d.](#)).

Finally, future research may broaden this comparative framework to other disaster-prone states with different SOFA architectures in order to test the transferability of these

findings and refine indicators of SOFA effectiveness along the IPOO pathway, including longer-term resilience and institutional outcomes ([Wiharta et al., 2008](#); [Voetelink, 2013](#)).

IV. Conclusions

This study examined how SOFAs, particularly the Philippines–U.S. VFA and the Philippines–Australia SOVFA, facilitate foreign military participation in HADR and function as instruments of defense diplomacy in non-traditional security contexts. Using qualitative case study methods, policy-oriented document analysis, qualitative content analysis, and limited process tracing, the study finds that SOFA agreements can serve as operational enablers that help reduce legal and administrative uncertainty for entry, movement, logistics support, and customs facilitation. These enabling conditions can support faster and more predictable coordination when assistance is formally requested by the host state. However, the cases also show that legal arrangements alone do not ensure effective disaster response; outcomes remain contingent on coordination quality, local absorption capacity, and clear transition planning. The findings should be interpreted in light of the study’s reliance on documentary evidence and case-selection limits, which constrain generalization beyond the selected Philippine disaster cases.

The main policy implications are threefold. First, SOFA-related procedures should be further standardized and integrated in AFP–NDRRMC–DFA standard operating procedures for requests, clearances, access, liaison, and transition. Second, LGUs and civilian cluster leads should be further trained and better prepared to receive, task, and integrate foreign military support within a civilian-led and time-bound response. Third, joint planning, HADR exercises, and after-action reviews should be sustained, expanded, and more systematically linked to doctrine, and preparedness plans, and local readiness measures in order to strengthen the operationalization of existing coordination procedures. Future research should refine indicators of SOFA-enabled performance and test them through comparative case studies in other disaster-prone states.

References

- ASEAN Regional Forum. (2010). Strategic guidance for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) (Draft Version 8). https://www.rcrc-resilience-southeastasia.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/1_ARF_Strategic_Guidance_for_Humanitarian_Assistance_and_Disaster_Relief.pdf
- Australian Embassy, The Philippines. (2013, November 14). MR131114 – Australia increases assistance to victims of Typhoon Yolanda to PHP 1.2 billion. <https://philippines.embassy.gov.au/mnla/medrel131114.html>
- Australian Government Department of Defence. (2013, November 13). Defence provides heavy lift to Philippines support. <https://www.minister.defence.gov.au/media-releases/2013-11-13/minister-defence-defence-provides-heavy-lift-philippines-support>
- Bowen, G. A. (2009). Document analysis as a qualitative research method. *Qualitative Research Journal*, 9(2), 27–40.

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/240807798_Document_Analysis_as_a_Qualitative_Research_Method

- Canyon, D. V., Ryan, B. J., & Burkle, F. M. (2019). Rationale for military involvement in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief. *Prehospital and Disaster Medicine*, 35(1), 92–97.
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/337799363_Rationale_for_Military_Involvement_in_Humanitarian_Assistance_and_Disaster_Relief/link/5e04356a299bf10bc3797221/download?tp=eyJjb250ZXh0Ijp7ImZpcnN0UGFnZSI6InB1YmxpY2F0aW9uIiwicGFnZSI6InB1YmxpY2F0aW9uIn19
- Carpenter, T. (2009, October 5). Joint Special Operations Task Force-Philippines assists in rescue efforts during Manila flooding.
DVIDS. <https://www.dvidshub.net/news/39670/joint-special-operations-task-force-philippines-assists-rescue-efforts-during-manila-flooding>
- Chang, J. Y. (2022, October 14). Benign defence diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific programme for senior military officers (IDSS Paper No. 056; IP22056). S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University. <https://rsis.edu.sg/rsis-publication/idss/ip22056-benign-defence-diplomacy-in-the-asia-pacific-programme-for-senior-military-officers/>
- Conderman, P. J. (2013). Status of armed forces on foreign territory agreements (SOFA). In Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law. Oxford University Press. <https://opil.ouplaw.com/display/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e410>
- Cottey, A., & Forster, A. (2004). Reshaping defence diplomacy: New roles for military cooperation and assistance. Oxford University Press.
- Creswell, J. W., & Poth, C. N. (2018). Qualitative inquiry and research design: Choosing among five approaches (4th ed.). SAGE.
- Drab, L. (2018). Defence diplomacy – An important tool for the implementation of foreign policy. Security and Defence. <https://securityanddefence.pl/pdf-103330-36171?filename=Defence-diplomacy---an-im.pdf>
- Duffield, M. (2007). Development, security and unending war: Governing the world of peoples. Polity.
- Dy, P., & Stephens, T. (2016). *The Typhoon Haiyan response: Strengthening coordination among Philippine government, civil society, and international actors*. Harvard Kennedy School. https://www.hks.harvard.edu/sites/default/files/centers/research-initiatives/crisisleadership/files/Dy_and_Stephens.pdf
- Ehrenfeld, J., & Aanenson, C. (2016, December 15). Frameworks and partnerships. PeaceWinds America. https://peacewindsamerica.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/Frameworks_and_Partnerships_Fulltext.pdf
- Fleck, D. (2012). Guidebook: Drafting status-of-forces agreements (SOFAs). Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF). https://www.dcaf.ch/sites/default/files/publications/documents/SOFA_Guidebook_Eng-web.pdf

- Gassert, F., Burke, S., & Zimmerman, R. (2020, March 31). Part II: Military humanitarian and disaster relief response capacity in the Indo-Pacific region. In *UPTEMPO: The United States and natural disasters in the Pacific*. New America. <https://www.newamerica.org/resource-security/reports/uptempo-united-states-and-natural-disasters/part-ii-military-humanitarian-and-disaster-relief-response-capacity-in-the-indo-pacific-region/>
- Government of Australia, & Government of the Republic of the Philippines. (2007, May 31). Agreement between the Government of Australia and the Government of the Republic of the Philippines concerning the status of visiting forces of each state in the territory of the other state. Parliament of Australia, Joint Standing Committee on Treaties. https://legacy.senate.gov.ph/15th_congress/treaties/agreement%20govt%20rp%20and%20govt%20of%20australia%20visiting%20forces.pdf
- Government of the Republic of the Philippines, & Government of the United States of America. (1998, February 10). Visiting Forces Agreement between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the Government of the United States of America. U.S. Department of State. <https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2019/02/12931-Philippines-Defense-Status-of-Forces-10.9.1998.pdf>
- Government of the Republic of the Philippines, Asian Development Bank, European Commission, United Nations, & World Bank. (2010). *Philippines: Typhoons Ondoy and Pepeng: Post-disaster needs assessment*. Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery. https://www.gfdr.org/sites/default/files/PDNA_Philippines_2009_Main_Report.pdf
- Hall, R. A. (2008). Civil–military cooperation in international disaster response: The Japanese Self-Defense Forces’ deployment in Aceh, Indonesia. *The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis*, 20(4), 383–400. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10163270802507310>
- International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. (2007). Law and legal issues in international disaster response: A desk study. https://disasterlaw.ifrc.org/sites/default/files/media/disaster_law/2020-08/113600-idrl-deskstudy-en.pdf
- International Security Advisory Board. (2015, January 16). Report on status of forces agreements. U.S. Department of State. <https://2009-2017.state.gov/documents/organization/236456.pdf>
- Japan International Cooperation Agency. (2025). Philippines disaster risk profile report. <https://openjicareport.jica.go.jp/pdf/1000023396.pdf>
- Keohane, R. O., & Nye, J. S. (1977). *Power and interdependence: World politics in transition*. Little, Brown.
- Kodama, Y. (2021). The implications of international rescue and relief operations for domestic regulatory regimes—Lessons from the 2011 East Japan Earthquake. *Journal of International Humanitarian Action*, 6(1), Article 1. <https://doi.org/10.1186/s41018-020-00085-1>
- Krippendorff, K. (2018). *Content analysis: An introduction to its methodology* (4th ed.). SAGE.

- Kusek, J. Z., & Rist, R. C. (2004). Ten steps to a results-based monitoring and evaluation system: A handbook for development practitioners. World Bank.
- Lum, T., & Margesson, R. (2014, February 10). Typhoon Haiyan (Yolanda): U.S. and international response to Philippines disaster (CRS Report No. R43309). Congressional Research Service.
https://digital.library.unt.edu/ark:/67531/metadc282292/m1/1/high_res_d/R43309_2014Feb10.pdf
- Mason, R. C. (2012). Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA): What is it, and how has it been utilized? (CRS Report No. RL34531). Congressional Research Service. <https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/126384/187406.pdf>
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (2022, September 8). Japan–U.S. security arrangements. <https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/security/arrange.html>
- National Disaster Risk Reduction and Management Council. (n.d.). *National disaster response plan for hydro-meteorological hazards* (Version 2.1). Disaster Response Operations Monitoring and Information Center. <https://dromic.dswd.gov.ph/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/NDRP-Hydro-Meteorological-Hazards.pdf>
- Neethling, T. (2000). Military forces and non-traditional military roles: Assessing post-Cold War developments and considering some implications for the SANDF. *Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies*, 30(1), 1–20.
<https://journals.ufs.ac.za/index.php/jch/article/view/3504/3333>
- Nepomuceno, P. (2021, August 19). PH-Australia defense logistics accord to boost disaster response, regional security. Philippine News Agency. <https://www.pna.gov.ph/articles/1150932>
- PAGASA. (2020). Annual report on Philippine tropical cyclones 2020. https://pubfiles.pagasa.dost.gov.ph/pagasaweb/files/tamss/weather/tcsummary/PAGASA_ARTC_2020.pdf
- PAGASA. (2021). Annual report on Philippine tropical cyclones 2021. https://pubfiles.pagasa.dost.gov.ph/pagasaweb/files/tamss/weather/tcsummary/PAGASA_ARTC_2021.pdf
- PAGASA. (2022). Annual report on Philippine tropical cyclones 2022. https://pubfiles.pagasa.dost.gov.ph/pagasaweb/files/tamss/weather/tcsummary/PAGASA_ARTC_2022_compressed.pdf
- PAGASA. (2023). Annual climate bulletin 2023. <https://pubfiles.pagasa.dost.gov.ph/pagasaweb/files/cad/CLIMATOLOGICAL%20PUBLICATIONS/2023.pdf>
- PAGASA. (2024). Annual report 2024. <https://pubfiles.pagasa.dost.gov.ph/pagasaweb/files/transparency/Fiscal%20Year%202024%20Annual%20Report.pdf>
- Paris, R. (2001). Human security: Paradigm shift or hot air? *International Security*, 26(2), 87–102. <https://doi.org/10.1162/016228801753191141>
- Parker, W., Berry, P., & Wall, A. (2016). Improving HA/DR coordination: Case study and recommendations. *Joint Force Quarterly*, 80(1st Quarter), 88–95.
<https://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/News/News-Article->

[View/Article/733173/improving-hadr-coordination-case-study-and-recommendations/](#)

- Rabena, A. J. (2020, February 12). Philippines–U.S. alliance under Duterte: Unravelling? RSIS Commentaries. S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. <https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/CO20025.pdf>
- Sari, A. (2008). Status of forces and status of mission agreements under the ESDP: The EU's evolving practice. *European Journal of International Law*, 19(1), 67–100. <https://academic.oup.com/ejil/article/19/1/67/430816>
- Silalahi, A. E. (2023). ADMM/ADMM-Plus as confidence-building measures through non-traditional issues (ASEAN). *International Journal of Humanities Education and Social Sciences*, 2(6), 1719–1833. <https://ijhess.com/index.php/ijhess/article/view/460/412>
- Stake, R. E. (1995). *The art of case study research*. SAGE.
- The White House. (2013, November 19). Fact sheet: U.S. response to Typhoon Haiyan. <https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2013/11/19/fact-sheet-us-response-typhoon-haiyan>
- Tobler, S. (2025, November 25). 374 AW Log-QRF conducts first real-world deployment during Philippine typhoon response. U.S. Indo-Pacific Command. <https://www.pacom.mil/Media/NEWS/News-Article-View/Article/4343087/374-aw-log-qrf-conducts-first-real-world-deployment-during-philippine-typhoon-r/>
- Trajano, J. C. I. (2016). *Building resilience from within: Enhancing humanitarian civil-military coordination in post-Haiyan Philippines*. S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. <https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/NTS-Report-Building-Resilience-from-Within-Enhancing-Humanitarian-Civil-Military-Coordination-in-Post-Haiyan-Philippines-final.pdf>
- Tschirgi, N. (2010). The security–politics–development nexus: The lessons of state-building in Sub-Saharan Africa (RSCAS Working Paper 2010/35). European University Institute. https://kpsrl.org/sites/kpsrl/files/publications/files/erd_background_paper_tschirgi.pdf
- United Nations Development Programme. (1994). Human development report 1994: New dimensions of human security. <https://hdr.undp.org/system/files/documents/hdr1994encompletenostats.pdf>
- United Nations General Assembly. (1991). Strengthening of the coordination of emergency humanitarian assistance of the United Nations system (Resolution 46/182). <https://docs.un.org/en/a/res/46/182>
- United Nations Office for Disaster Risk Reduction. (2019). Global assessment report on disaster risk reduction 2019. https://gar.undrr.org/sites/default/files/reports/2019-05/full_gar_report.pdf
- United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. (2007). Guidelines on the use of foreign military and civil defence assets in disaster relief (“Oslo

- Guidelines”) (Rev. 1.1). <https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/world/oslo-guidelines-guidelines-use-foreign-military-and-civil-defence-assets-disaster-relief-revision-11-november-2007-enzh>
- United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. (2013, November 20). *Philippines: Typhoon Haiyan situation report no. 14*. ReliefWeb. <https://reliefweb.int/report/philippines/philippines-typhoon-haiyan-situation-report-no-14-20-november-2013>
- U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific. (2012, December 12). U.S. Government assistance to the Philippines for Typhoon Pablo relief [Fact sheet]. <https://www.mcipac.marines.mil/Portals/28/Documents/121212-PhiFS.pdf>
- U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific. (2025, November 24). U.S. military forces conclude disaster relief efforts in Philippines following Typhoons Fung-Wong and Kalmaegi [Press release]. <https://www.marforpac.marines.mil/Media-Room/Press-Release/Article/4341447/us-military-forces-conclude-disaster-relief-efforts-in-philippines-following-ty/>
- U.S. Pacific Command. (2013, November 16). Military, USAID continue relief efforts in Philippines. Defense Visual Information Distribution Service (DVIDS). <https://www.dvidshub.net/news/507180/military-usaid-continue-relief-efforts-philippines>
- Velasco, M. A. M. (2015). The Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) in the Philippines: Insights on issues of sovereignty, security and foreign policy. *Asia Pacific Journal of Multidisciplinary Research*, 3(4), 82–89. https://www.academia.edu/41244858/The_Visiting_Forces_Agreement_VFA_in_the_Philippines_Insights_on_Issues_of_Sovereignty_Security_and_foreign_policy
- Vernaza, T. C. (2010, October 23). 31st MEU aids isolated Philippine towns after Super Typhoon Juan devastates area. Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet. <https://www.cpf.navy.mil/Newsroom/News/Article/2758798/31st-meu-aids-isolated-philippine-towns-after-super-typhoon-juan-devastates-area/>
- Voetelink, J. (2013). Status of forces and criminal jurisdiction. *Netherlands International Law Review*, 60(2), 231–250. <https://doi.org/10.1017/S0165070X12001179>
- Wiharta, S., Ahmad, H., Haine, J.-Y., Löfgren, J., & Randall, T. (2008). The effectiveness of foreign military assets in natural disaster response. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. <https://www.humanitarianlibrary.org/sites/default/files/2014/02/SIPRI.pdf>
- World Bank. (2017). Philippines—Disaster risk finance country note. <https://documents.worldbank.org/en/publication/documents-reports/documentdetail/723691502871473411/philippines-disaster-risk-finance-country-note>
- World Bank, & Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and Recovery. (2016). The Philippines: Country disaster risk profile. <https://www.gfdrr.org/sites/default/files/publication/PHILIPPINES2016.pdf>